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Self-control failure occurs when an individual experiences a conflict between immediate 
desires and longer-term goals, recognises psychological forces that hinder goal-directed 
action, tries to resist them but fails in the attempt.  Behavioural economists often invoke 
assumptions about self-control failure to justify proposals for policy interventions.  These 
arguments require workable methods for eliciting individuals’ goals and for verifying 
occurrences of self-control failure, but developing such methods confronts two problems.  
First, it is not clear that individuals’ goals are context-independent.  Second, facing an actual 
conflict between a desire and a self-acknowledged goal, a person may consciously choose not 
to resist the desire, thinking that spontaneity is more important than self-control.  We address 
these issues through an online survey that elicited individuals’ self-reported judgements about 
the relative importance of self-control and spontaneity in conflicts between enjoyment and 
health-related goals.  To test for context-sensitivity, the judgement-elicitation questions were 
preceded by a memory-recall task which directed participants’ attention either to the 
enjoyment of acting on desires or to the satisfaction of achieving goals.  We found little 
evidence of context-sensitivity.  In both treatments, however, judgements that favoured 
spontaneity were expressed with roughly the same frequency and strength as judgments that 
favoured self-control. 
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In offering guidance about public policy, behavioural economists often use the concept of 
self-control failure to support claims that, in specific contexts, individuals’ actual choices are 
contrary to their best interests, as judged by those individuals themselves.  Policy 
interventions are proposed with the aim of helping people to reach goals that they 
acknowledge as theirs, but which forces within their own psychology hinder them from 
achieving.1  An individual experiences self-control failure if he or she is aware of such forces, 
tries to resist them, but fails in the attempt.  Policies that are designed to counter such failures 
can be defended as non-paternalistic on the grounds that the policy-maker’s intention is to 
satisfy individuals’ self-acknowledged goals.2 
 If this kind of justification is to be used to guide public policy, behavioural economics 
needs workable methods for eliciting individuals’ goals and for verifying occurrences of self-
control failure.  Surprisingly little attention has been given to the design of such methods.  
Potential questions about people’s goals are often treated as having self-evident answers, as 
when Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 73), advocating nudging people towards healthier lifestyles, 
introduce the New Year’s Resolution Test: ‘[H]ow many people vow to smoke more 
cigarettes, drink more martinis, or have more chocolate donuts in the morning next year?’  
For Thaler and Sunstein, this question is merely rhetorical, but the premise of our paper is 
that the actual content of people’s self-acknowledged goals, and the normative significance 
that people actually attach to those goals, are research topics that require real answers.  
 It is uncontroversial that many people profess long-term goals from which they 
sometimes deviate when facing more immediate desires.  However, recognition of such 
inconsistencies leaves open the question of how they should be interpreted from a normative 
point of view, or in the formation of public policy.  Advocates of interventions to counter 
self-control failures often appeal to dual-self interpretations.  For example, Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008: 41–42) represent self-control problems in terms of a person’s two selves, a 
far-sighted ‘Planner’ and a myopic ‘Doer’.  Describing the roles of these two selves, Thaler 
and Sunstein say: ‘The Planner is trying to promote your long-term welfare but must cope 
with the feelings, mischief, and strong will of the Doer, who is exposed to the temptations 
that come with arousal’.  There is an implicit assumption that the Planner’s judgements about 
goals retain their normative authority – they represent what the person ‘truly’ values – even 
when the actual human being is consciously choosing to ignore them.  On this view, public 
policy should help the Planner to maintain control when the Doer is trying to rebel.3  But if 
policymakers want to respect individuals’ own judgements, they need to ask how far, and 
how consistently, real human beings identify with their Planners rather than with their Doers.  
Our aim in this paper is to place these questions on the agenda of behavioural public policy 
and to take some preliminary steps towards answering them. 
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 We start from the idea that self-control – constraining yourself to act on long-term 
goals – can be contrasted with spontaneity – leaving yourself scope to respond to situations as 
they arise, rather than following pre-scripted plans.  As an informal illustration of this 
contrast, consider a different New Year’s Resolution Test, in which individuals are asked to 
rate the importance they attach to keeping their New Year’s resolutions.  A high rating might 
be interpreted as a personal judgement in favour of self-control relative to spontaneity; a low 
rating might be interpreted as the opposite.  Normatively, neither of these attitudes seems 
self-evidently superior to the other; one might associate self-control with the ‘Big Five’ trait 
of conscientiousness, and spontaneity with openness to experience.  Thus, acting contrary to a 
professed goal should not be treated as sufficient evidence of a failed attempt to exercise self-
control or of a desire to be helped: as viewed by the actor, it might be a conscious expression 
of spontaneity.  
  In this paper, we report an online survey which investigated the relative importance 
that individuals attach to self-control and spontaneity in relation to conflicts between 
immediate enjoyment and long-term health goals.  We focus on three issues that need to be 
faced if public policies are to be justified as non-paternalistic responses to self-control 
failures.   
First, do people generally judge self-control to be more important than spontaneity?  
That this is the case is an implicit assumption of many behavioural policy recommendations, 
but might turn out to be false. 
Second, how homogeneous are people’s judgements about these attitudes?  Even if 
the judgements of a majority of people favoured self-control, policymakers might want to 
take some account of contrary judgements held by significant minorities. 
Third, are those judgements context-independent?  Much of the evidence that is cited 
in support of the hypothesis of self-control failure is about the context-dependence of 
revealed preferences – the fact that preferences between given consumption possibilities 
differ systematically according to the presence or absence of cues that draw attention to 
particular temptations.  It is also known that when people report their overall satisfaction with 
their lives, the implicit weights they give to different aspects of life can depend on what is 
currently the focus of their attention (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998) – an effect summed up 
in Kahneman’s (2011: 402) ‘fortune cookie’ maxim: ‘Nothing in life is as important as you 
think it is when you are thinking about it’.  If preferences and life-satisfaction judgements are 
often context-dependent, the same might be true of people’s attitudes to self-control and 
spontaneity. 
  Since our respondents were not recruited as a representative sample, our survey must 
be treated as an exploratory study.  Our main findings were as follows.  Overall, judgements 
that favoured spontaneity were expressed with roughly the same frequency and strength as 
5 
 
judgments that favoured self-control.  When asked to express judgements about what was 
important in life, most participants maintained both that it was important to make long-term 
plans and stick to them and that there was no harm in occasionally taking small enjoyments 
rather than sticking to those plans.  We found strong evidence of individual heterogeneity.  
Because of this, we defined an ordinal scale for measuring individuals’ judgements about the 
relative importance of self-control and spontaneity in relation to everyday conflicts between 
enjoyment and health-related goals.  Using this scale, we found little evidence of context-
dependence.   
 We conclude that identifying when and where individuals want to be helped to avoid 
self-control failures is more difficult – both empirically and conceptually – than many 
behavioural economists seem to think.  We believe that our findings point to the importance 
of treating desires for spontaneity as equally deserving of attention as desires for self-control, 
and as suggesting interesting lines of further research.  
As a preliminary to describing our study, we briefly discuss some of the ways in 
which the concept of self-control failure is used in behavioural economics, and review some 
existing evidence about people’s everyday experience of self-control problems. 
1.  Self-control failure in behavioural economics 
The idea that deviations from neoclassical rationality can be explained in terms of self-
control failure is common in behavioural economics.  Such explanations are not confined to 
modes of behaviour that might reasonably be viewed as addictions, such as problem drinking, 
compulsive gambling or reckless borrowing.  For example, the possibility of self-control 
failure has been invoked in explanations of inconsistencies in time preference (O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 2003), of why people buy gym memberships when it would be cheaper to pay for 
each visit separately (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2006),4 of why shoppers use 
inconvenient entrances to stores rather than walk past charity collectors (Andreoni, Rao and 
Trachtman, 2017), and of why experimental subjects show extreme risk aversion when 
choosing between low-prize lotteries (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006). 
 In two founding manifestos of behavioural welfare economics, Camerer et al. (2003: 
1217, 1238–1242) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003: 1168, 1184) cite inconsistencies in time 
preference as examples of self-control failures that public policy should aim to counter.  The 
emphasis on self-control failure is particularly marked in Sunstein and Thaler’s paper, which 
uses the composite phrase ‘bounded rationality and bounded self-control’ as a generic term 
for the class of errors or biases that individuals should be helped to avoid.  Or, as Sunstein 
and Thaler (2003: 1162) put it in a programmatic passage, their concern is with cases in 
which ‘individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare – decisions that they 
would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of 
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self-control’.  When they present their now-famous cafeteria story, they say that their 
proposal that the fruit should be placed before the desserts on the cafeteria counter is 
designed ‘to help people to solve their self-control problems’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 
1184). 
 In their later book Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein repeatedly emphasise that their 
recommendations are designed to ‘make choosers better off, as judged by themselves’ (2008: 
5, italics in original; see also 10, 12, 80).  The implication is that Sunstein and Thaler’s 
concept of self-control failure involves acting contrary to one’s own judgement.  But when 
they set out the justification for nudging people towards healthy eating, their main arguments 
are not based on evidence about people’s actual judgements: 
Consider the issue of obesity.  Rates of obesity in the United States are now 
approaching 20 per cent, and more than 60 per cent of Americans are considered 
either obese or overweight.  There is overwhelming evidence that obesity increases 
risks of heart disease and diabetes, frequently leading to premature death. … We 
do not claim that everyone who is overweight is necessarily failing to act 
rationally, but we do reject the claim that all or almost all Americans are choosing 
their diet optimally… With respect to diet, smoking, and drinking, people’s current 
choices cannot reasonably be claimed to be the best means of promoting their well-
being.  Indeed, many smokers, drinkers and overeaters are willing to pay third 
parties to help them make better decisions.  (p. 7)  
Notice that, except in the final sentence (which surely applies only to a small minority of the 
relevant population), the evidence that Thaler and Sunstein present is about the harmful 
effects of obesity, not about the mental processes that underlie the choices that cumulatively 
cause it.  As Sugden (2017) points out, self-control failure is only one of a wide range of 
psychological mechanisms that are potential explanations of an individual’s tendency to eat 
unhealthy but enjoyable food.  Many of these mechanisms – for example, procrastination, 
social proof, availability, cognitive dissonance, intrapersonal empathy gaps and self-
deception – do not depend on the assumption that, in the individual’s own judgement, there is 
a conflict between his immediate desires and his long-term well-being.  Because what is at 
issue here is not whether people’s choices are rational or optimal or the best means of 
promoting their well-being, but whether they are the result of self-control failure, 
interventions that are designed to make people better-off as judged by themselves must be 
based on information about people’s actual judgements.          
 Many behavioural-economic discussions of self-control problems use the distinction 
between System 1 and System 2 mental operations, as proposed by Wason and Evans (1975) 
and developed by Kahneman (2003).  System 1 operations are fast and automatic; System 2 
operations are slow and under conscious control.  This distinction is used by Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008: 19–39) and Kahneman (2011) as a way of organising behavioural findings.  
In both cases, the suggestion is that System 1 is liable to induce preferences and judgements 
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that are systematically biased and that System 2 is capable of correcting.  As Kahneman and 
Sunstein (2006: 92) put it: ‘System 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment 
problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may 
endorse, correct, or override’.  Self-control problems can be fitted into this framework by 
treating a person’s immediate desires as unmediated products of System 1, and her 
judgements about her goals as products of System 2 operations (to which System 1 may have 
provided inputs).  However, we see no good reason to assume that System 2 is always able to 
produce context-independent judgements.  (Recall the possibly analogous finding that 
judgements about life satisfaction can be context-dependent.)  Nor is it necessarily the case 
that, as Kahneman (2011: 21) suggests, ‘[w]hen we think of ourselves, we identify with 
System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to 
think about and what to do’.  A person who values spontaneity might sometimes identify with 
her System 1 feelings, and override goal-directed thoughts issuing from her System 2.   
2.  Evidence of everyday self-control 
Hofmann et al. (2012a, 2012b) report a seminal study which uses experience sampling to 
elicit individuals’ experiences of desires over the course of a week of ordinary life.  Each 
participant was asked to carry a smart phone for seven consecutive days.  Each day, the 
participant received seven calls, at randomised intervals, and reported desires that she was 
currently feeling or had felt in the last half hour.  For each of these desires, she reported: (i) 
its content, (ii) its strength, (iii) whether she had attempted to resist it, (iv) whether she had 
enacted it, (v) whether it conflicted with a personal goal, and if so, (vi) the goal with which it 
conflicted.   This study can be interpreted as sampling individuals’ everyday experiences of 
self-control problems, and the authors themselves (2012a: 1319) interpret it in relation to a 
four-stage psychological model of ‘intentional’ and ‘effortful’ self-control.  In the first stage, 
the individual experiences some desire.  In the second stage, she assesses whether the desire 
conflicts with a goal.  If she recognises such a conflict, the desire is problematic.  If so, there 
is a third stage in which she decides whether to resist the desire.  If she decides to resist, she 
attempts self-control.  If so, there is a fourth stage in which the attempt may succeed (the 
desire is not enacted) or fail (it is enacted).   
 Delaney and Lades (2017) report a study that is closely modelled on that of Hofmann 
et al., but uses the day reconstruction method (Kahneman et al., 2004) in place of experience 
sampling.  Each participant was first asked to complete a time-use diary of the previous day, 
breaking the day down into a set of discrete episodes, and then responded to a series of 
questions about each episode.  Participants reported up to three desires that they had felt 
during the episode.  For each desire, they answered questions similar to those used by 
Hoffman et al. to elicit properties (i) to (vi). 
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 The two studies produced broadly similar results.  Hofmann et al.’s 205 participants 
reported a total of 7827 desire episodes, of which 47 per cent were problematic.  Of all 
desires (problematic or not), 42 per cent were actively resisted.  Of those that were resisted, 
17 per cent were enacted (Hofmann et al., 2012a: 1325).5  Delaney and Lades’s 142 
participants reported a total of 2059 desires.  69.1 per cent of these desires were problematic.  
Participants attempted to resist 56.1 per cent of problematic desires.  In 35.1 per cent of cases 
in which such an attempt was made, the attempt failed (p. 1161).  Expressing Delaney and 
Lades’s data in more stylised form: on an average sampled day, an average participant faced 
ten self-control problems, attempted self-control five or six times, and experienced self-
control failure twice.  Hofmann et al. (2012b: 584–585) report that the categories of goals 
that most commonly conflicted with desires were ‘health-related’ (directed at health or 
fitness) and ‘time use’ (directed at using time efficiently and getting things done); self-control 
failure rates were highest for desires for ‘engaging in media use’ and for ‘work’ (not, 
interestingly, for avoiding work).  In Delaney and Lades’s study, the most common self-
control failures were in relation to ‘postponing a task’ and ‘using social media’ (p. 1161). 
 The most frequently reported self-control problems might seem rather mundane 
(Hofmann et al. [2012b: 585] express mild surprise at not finding more evidence of 
‘disastrous failures to control sexual impulses and urges to spend money’), but this is likely to 
be the effect of the everyday sampling frame.  It seems clear that self-control problems, 
successes and failures are all common features of everyday life.  To this extent, the evidence 
is consistent with a System 1/System 2 model in which automatic processes produce desires 
which cognitive processes sometimes but not always override. 
 However, the observation of self-control attempts does not imply that individuals’ 
judgements about their goals, or about the importance of being goal-directed, are stable or 
context-independent.  Indeed, Hofmann et al. (2012a: 1328–1329) report some evidence to 
the contrary.  Some of their participants responded to questions about the presence or absence 
of other people when the desires were experienced.  The presence of other people had no 
significant effect on the strength of desires or on perceptions of conflict between desires and 
goals, but individuals were more likely to attempt to resist highly-conflicted desires if other 
people were around.  There was also a tendency for the presence of other people to inhibit the 
enactment of desires in general, whether problematic or not. 
 In relation to our research questions, it is particularly interesting that many 
problematic desires (44 per cent in Delaney and Lades’s study, possibly around 30 per cent in 
Hofmann et al.’s – see note 5) were not resisted.  These were cases in which a participant 
recognised that a current desire conflicted with a personal goal, but chose not to attempt self-
control.  In other words: acting contrary to a self-acknowledged goal is not equivalent to a 
failure of self-control. 
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3.  Our survey design 
Our survey was designed to investigate individuals’ judgements about the personal 
importance of being disposed to resist desires that conflict with goals.  We focused on 
conflicts between desires for immediately enjoyable activities and goals for good health – a 
domain in which, as evidenced by Hofmann et al.’s findings, conflicts between desires and 
goals are particularly common. 
 It is important to recognise that our objective was not to elicit individuals’ current 
preferences for or against imposing constraints on their future choices.  We take as given that, 
as implied by Planner/Doer models and as shown in the everyday self-control studies 
reviewed in the preceding section, people’s preferences with respect to self-control are often 
temporally inconsistent.  Acting on the preferences of her Planner, a person may choose to 
impose constraints on her possible future actions, but when the future arrives, she may act on 
the preferences of her Doer in trying to evade those constraints.  Our intention was not to add 
to existing knowledge about the content of these two types of preferences: it was to 
investigate how people adjudicate between them – how far they identify with their Planners, 
and how far with their Doers.  Participants were compensated for the time spent in answering 
the survey questions but, since the purpose of those questions was to elicit individuals’ 
personal judgments about their own lives, there was no way of rewarding ‘correct’ or 
‘successful’ responses.   
 To allow an investigation of context-dependence (or independence), survey 
respondents were divided randomly between two treatments.  All respondents answered the 
same questions about attitudes to self-control and spontaneity.  In one treatment, these 
questions were preceded by a task that was intended to direct attention to the enjoyable 
properties of activities that might conflict with health-related goals.  In the other, they were 
preceded by a task that was intended to direct attention to the sense of satisfaction derived 
from achieving health-related goals through activities that might not be immediately 
enjoyable. 
 In pre-registering the study, we did not propose any hypothesis about the direction in 
which individuals’ judgements about the importance of self-control might be differentially 
affected by cues that directed their attention either to enjoyment or to goals.  The most 
obvious possibility is that cues that direct attention to enjoyment induce judgements that give 
a low weight to self-control.  But we recognised an alternative possibility: thoughts about 
enjoyment might act as reminders to exert self-control, and so induce judgements favouring 
self-control.  Either effect, if observed, would cast doubt on the idea that individuals have 
stable attitudes to self-control problems.  Because each participant’s attention has to be 
directed in only one direction, we must use between-subject tests.  A corollary of this is that 
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there is little scope for investigating whether some individuals are susceptible to one effect 
and some to the other. 
 The survey had three parts – an attention-focusing task, a judgement elicitation task, 
and a short questionnaire.  We used a pre-registered pilot study to determine the form of the 
attention-focusing task.6 
 The design of the pilot was very similar to that of the main study, except that there 
were two pairs of attention-focusing treatments rather than the single pair used in the main 
survey.  In the pilot, 241 participants were randomly distributed between the resulting four 
treatments; 229 completed the survey.  One pair of treatments used memory recall tasks.  In 
the memory/enjoyment treatment, participants recalled memories relating to enjoyments that 
might be thought to conflict with health-related goals.  In the memory/goals treatment, they 
recalled memories of being satisfied about efforts to achieve health-related goals.  We will 
describe these treatments in more detail later.  The other pair of treatments used pictures to 
activate thoughts about enjoyment or long-term goals.  In the pictures/enjoyment treatment, 
participants were shown fourteen pictures, comprising six enjoyable foods, six enjoyable 
activities, one healthy food, and one healthy activity, and for each picture answered ‘How 
much would you enjoy this?’ on a 7-point scale.  In the pictures/goals treatment, participants 
were shown fourteen pictures, comprising six healthy foods, six healthy activities, one 
enjoyable food, and one enjoyable activity, and for each picture answered ‘How good do you 
think this would be for your health?’ on a 7-point scale.  We pre-committed to using 
whichever type of attention-focusing task induced more significant differences (irrespective 
of direction) in responses to the judgement elicitation task.  The judgement elicitation task 
comprised 32 questions divided by topic into four blocks – ‘self-control wishes’, ‘spontaneity 
wishes’, ‘regrets’ and ‘importance in life’– each of eight questions.  When pictures were 
used, there was no significant treatment effect for any of the four blocks.  When memory-
recall tasks were used, there were significant effects (higher scores on a spontaneity/self-
control scale in the memory/goals treatment) for two blocks (regrets and importance in life), 
and no significant effects for the other two blocks.  Following our pre-registered plan, we 
used the memory recall tasks in the main survey, which we now describe. 
 The survey was programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and conducted online using 
the Prolific platform.  We recruited 240 participants (90 male and 150 female), all of whom 
were UK residents with English as their first language.  The median age was 31.  Each 
participant received £2 for participating.  The median duration of the survey was less than ten 
minutes. To ensure good quality responses to tasks that were necessarily non-incentivised, the 
survey was designed to be short, easy to understand, and engaging.  The content of the 
survey, the hypotheses and the analysis plan were pre-registered.7  The three parts of the 
survey are described next, in the order in which they were faced. 
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3.1  The attention-focusing task 
For this task, each participant was randomly assigned to one of two treatments, designed to 
activate thoughts either about immediate enjoyment or about long-term goals.  The 
randomisation ensured that there were 120 participants in each treatment.  In the enjoyment 
treatment, participants were asked to think about ‘a memorable meal you have had (e.g. at a 
restaurant, at a friend’s house) when you particularly enjoyed the food’.  They were then 
asked to type answers to four questions about the meal: where it took place, who was there, 
which dish the respondent enjoyed most, and (with the added request to be ‘as detailed as you 
can’) why they enjoyed it.  Finally they reported how much they had enjoyed the dish, on a 
seven-point Likert scale.  In the goals treatment, participants were asked to think about ‘some 
effort that you have made (e.g. in relation to exercise or diet) that was good for your health 
and that you felt satisfied about having done’.  They were then asked to type answers to four 
questions about the effort: what they did, when they did it, why it was good for their health, 
and (with the added request to be ‘as detailed as you can’) why they felt satisfied about it.  
Finally they reported how satisfied they had been, on a seven-point Likert scale. 
 Although this task might be regarded as a ‘priming’ manipulation, it is significantly 
different from the types of task typically used in psychology to test hypotheses about 
priming.  For example, in a widely-cited experiment which built on the early work of Higgins 
et al. (1977) and Srull and Wyer (1979), Bargh et al. (1996) used tasks in which subjects were 
asked to unscramble sentences.  The content of these sentences varied; some were related to 
rudeness, some were related to politeness, and some were neutral.  The key finding was that, 
in a second stage of the experiment that was not overtly linked to the unscrambling task, 
subjects who had unscrambled sentences about rudeness were more likely than the others to 
interrupt a conversation.  Many subsequent experiments have used scrambled sentences or 
word search tasks as manipulations.8  These experiments test the hypothesis that, as a result 
of psychological processes below the level of consciousness, incidentally presented words or 
sentences activate mental constructs that influence subsequent judgements or behaviour.  In 
contrast, our design investigates the effects of conscious processes of memory retrieval, 
reasoning and judgement.  In our judgement elicitation task, participants need to think about 
the relative importance to them of self-control and spontaneity.  In striking such a balance, it 
really is relevant to recall previous experiences of conflict between desires and goals, 
previous feelings of enjoyment from acting contrary to one’s goals, and previous feelings of 
satisfaction from exercising self-control.  Our memory recall tasks were intended to direct a 
participant’s attention towards one or other of two sets of relevant considerations, aligned 
with either self-control or spontaneity.  In this respect, they are similar to the manipulations 
used by Schkade and Kahneman (1998) to investigate ‘focusing illusions’.  Importantly, they 
activate thoughts about temptations, but do not present actual temptations.  To put this 
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another way, our objective was to elicit cool judgements about situations which, if actually 
experienced, would be liable to activate hot emotions.   
3.2  The judgement elicitation task 
In this part of the study, every participant answered the same 32 questions. In each case, the 
respondent was shown a statement and asked ‘How well do you recognise yourself in this 
statement?’  Responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘not at all’ 
to ‘extremely well’.  For the purposes of the design, the questions were pre-classified into 
four blocks, each of eight questions.  However, this structure was not revealed to participants, 
who simply faced the 32 questions in a single sequence, randomised independently for each 
participant.  The statements are listed below, grouped into the four blocks and numbered for 
ease of reference.  Sixteen of these statements express attitudes favouring self-control; the 
other sixteen (marked with asterisks) express attitudes favouring spontaneity. 
Self-control wishes 
Q1.  I wish I ate more fruit and vegetables. 
Q2.  I ought to drink more mineral or tap water. 
Q3.  I wish I drank less sugary drinks. 
Q4.  I ought to eat less high-fat food. 
Q5.  I wish I took more exercise. 
Q6.  I ought to use the lift less often. 
Q7.  I ought to limit my screen time. 
Q8.  I wish I spent less of my leisure time just sitting around. 
Spontaneity wishes 
Q9*.  I wish I paid less attention to calorie labels. 
Q10*.  I wish I was more relaxed about eating or drinking what I like. 
Q11*.  I envy people who always eat what they like. 
Q12*.  I wish there was less social pressure to take exercise. 
Q13*.  I wish I felt less bad about lazing around. 
Q14*.  I envy people who don’t feel guilty about taking it easy. 
Q15*.  I wish I cared less about being in good shape. 
Q16*.  I envy people who don’t worry about their weight. 
Regrets 
Q17.  If I drink too much alcohol, I feel guilty later, even if I enjoyed it a lot at the 
time. 
Q18.  After ordering desserts in restaurants, I often feel regret. 
Q19.  After spending hours on my phone or watching TV, I often feel regret. 
13 
 
Q20.  I feel guilty if I take the lift when I could have walked up the stairs. 
Q21*.  After ordering a healthy dish, I often wish I’d chosen something tastier. 
Q22*.  If I choose to walk because it’s healthy, I often regret it along the way. 
Q23*.  I never feel regret after a nice meal, even if I ate too much. 
Q24*.  It doesn’t bother me if sometimes I skip my usual exercise. 
Importance in life 
Q25.  Once I set up an exercise routine, I do all I can to stick to it. 
Q26.   Eating healthily is very important to me, even if it means avoiding some of 
my favourite foods. 
Q27.  It’s important to make long-term plans and stick to them. 
Q28.  In life it’s important to be able to resist temptation. 
Q29.*  There’s no harm in occasionally taking a break from an exercise routine. 
Q30.*  Having occasional treats is an important source of happiness for me, even if 
they are bad for my health. 
Q31.*  I like my plans to be flexible and leave plenty of room for spontaneity. 
Q32.*  Tomorrow will look after itself – each day has troubles enough of its own. 
 The self-control wishes can be paraphrased as ‘I wish I exercised (or I ought to 
exercise) more self-control’.  They compare the individual’s actual degree of self-control 
with a counterfactual state in which that degree is higher.  They are examples of the kind of 
statement that Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 107) interpret as indicating that the individuals 
who make them ‘are open to a nudge’ and ‘might even be grateful for one’.  
 The spontaneity wishes have the opposite content: ‘I wish I exercised less self-
control’.  Agreeing with these statements carries the suggestion that being nudged towards 
self-control might be unwelcome.  
 The regret statements Q17–Q20 can be paraphrased as ‘After taking enjoyment rather 
than attempting self-control, I feel regret’.  Such statements are often interpreted as ex post 
reports of self-control failure.  In a Planner–Doer model, they might be interpreted as 
expressing a person’s identification with their inner Planner.  Q21–Q24 have one of two 
opposite contents: either ‘After exercising self-control rather than taking enjoyment, I feel 
regret’ (Q21 and Q22) or ‘After taking enjoyment rather than exercising self-control, I do not 
feel regret’ (Q23 and Q24).  They might be interpreted as expressing identification with an 
inner Doer (either by regretting an earlier decision in favour of self-control, or by approving 
an earlier decision not to exercise self-control).  Notice that the regret statements differ from 
the two types of wish statement in not using the respondent’s current lifestyle as a reference 
point.  Thus, a person who believed that her current degree of self-control was about right 
might disagree with the wish statements while recognising the regret statements as 
14 
 
descriptions of her feelings on occasions when she exercised too little or too much self-
control. 
 The importance in life statements are more reflective or philosophical than the others.  
They express judgements about the overall importance of self-control and spontaneity in the 
respondent’s life.  Q25–Q28 have the connotation ‘In life, it’s important to exercise self-
control’; statements Q29–Q32 have the contrasting connotation ‘In life, it’s important to be 
spontaneous’.  One might say that the first set of statements expresses a Planner’s view of 
life, while the second set expresses a Doer’s.  
3.3  The questionnaire 
In the final questionnaire, participants reported their age and gender and whether they 
followed any specific dietary regime.  Participants also answered two questions in which they 
were asked to rate the healthiness of their own habitual diet and exercise: ‘Relative to an 
average person of your age, would you say that your diet was: much less healthy …  much 
healthier?’ and ‘Relative to an average person of your age, would you say that you take: 
much less exercise … much more exercise?’  Each of these questions elicited responses on a 
seven-point Likert scale.  Our intention was to use participants’ responses to these questions 
as control variables in our tests for differences between the enjoyment and goals treatments.  
4.  Responses to the memory recall tasks 
We reviewed the responses to the memory recall task to check that our manipulation had 
worked as intended – that participants had taken the task seriously and had recalled specific 
experiences of enjoyable dishes or of satisfaction from healthy activities.  In considering each 
treatment, we gave particular attention to the question to which participants had been asked to 
be as detailed as they could. 
 In both treatments, all participants followed the instructions by describing some 
specific meal or activity, and gave relevant responses to all the memory recall questions.  The 
median length of answers to the ‘details’ question was 18 words in the enjoyment treatment 
and 19.5 words in the goals treatment (the respective means were 21.4 and 23.3).  Some 
respondents wrote whole paragraphs, but even the short answers gave cogent reasons for 
feeling enjoyment (for example, ‘I love lamb cooked over long time’, ‘Love puddings, sweet 
and tasty’) or satisfaction (‘Lost weight and felt happier’, ‘Felt energised’).  Participants’ 
ratings of remembered enjoyment or satisfaction on the 1–7 Likert scale were very high (the 
mean ratings were 6.69 for enjoyment and 6.23 for satisfaction). 
 In answering the ‘details’ question in the enjoyment treatment, most participants 
wrote (often quite lyrically) about the enjoyable features of the dish.  For example, on a meal 
eaten at home: ‘I enjoyed this meal because the salmon was very moist and succulent. We 
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also had potato and leek gratin and broccoli’.  On smoky BBQ ribs eaten at a restaurant: ‘It 
has a lot of flavour to it and the meat just falls off the bone.  They are big ribs too.’  In the 
goals treatment, almost all respondents described efforts concerning either diet or exercise.  
In descriptions of how the effort had been satisfying, two themes were particularly prevalent.  
One was pleasure in feeling or looking healthier.  For example, on a workout every morning: 
‘It boosted my mood and made me less tired throughout the day. It also made me feel fitter.’  
On going vegan: ‘ I got thinner and felt healthier.  It was great looking in the mirror and 
seeing myself as well as feeling less tired.’  The other theme was self-empowerment.  For 
example, on losing weight: ‘Because I felt like I had achieved something by using my 
willpower’.  On exercise: ‘Because it made me feel better about my self’. 
 Overall, these responses are coherent and psychologically credible, and clearly 
unaffected by the lack of direct incentives.  It seems clear that the attention-focusing task was 
engaging and activated real memories of personally significant episodes of enjoyment and 
self-control.   
5.  Tests for context-dependence 
Following a pre-registered plan for the analysis of the data, we coded each participant’s 
response to each of the 32 questions from 1 to 7 on a spontaneity/self-control scale, reverse 
coding the statements favouring spontaneity.  So, on this scale, 1 corresponds with ‘not at all’ 
recognising oneself in a statement favouring self-control or recognising oneself ‘extremely 
well’ in a statement favouring spontaneity; 7 corresponds with the opposite extremes.  The 
central point of the scale is 4.  Our prior expectation was that, for each participant considered 
separately, there would be positive correlation between responses (coded as we have 
described) to any pair of questions, legitimating the use of an individual’s mean score for the 
whole set of 32 questions as an index of their overall judgements about spontaneity and self-
control (interpreted as opposites of one another on a single psychological scale).  However, 
we recognised that each of the four blocks of questions tapped into a different aspect of 
spontaneity/self-control judgements, and hence that individuals’ mean scores for each of the 
four separate blocks might have additional information content.  Our pre-registered tests for 
context-dependence in spontaneity/self-control judgements use non-parametric and 
regression methods to compare overall and block-specific scores between the two treatments. 
 Mean scores, averaging over the 120 participants in each treatment, are shown in 
Table 1.  The final column of the table reports the p-value of a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test 
for differences between the distributions of responses between the two treatments.  Overall, 
there is no significant difference between the treatments.  Only one of the four blocks 
(regrets) shows a significant difference, with higher scores in the goals treatment; even here, 
the effect size is small and there is significance only at the 10 per cent level. 
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[Table 1 near here] 
 Table 2 reports OLS regression results.9  In each regression equation, the dependent 
variable is a participant’s mean score on the spontaneity/self-control scale, either for all 32 
questions, or for one of the blocks of eight questions.  The treatment variable is a dummy 
which takes the value 1 in the goals treatment.  There are controls for age (in years),10 gender 
(with female as the baseline), and for responses to the diet and exercise questions in the final 
part of the survey, with the least (most) healthy diet and least (most) exercise coded as 1 (7). 
 Consistently with the Mann-Whitney tests, there are no significant treatment effects.  
Diet and exercise have significantly negative effects on scores for self-control wishes and 
generally positive effects on scores for the other blocks.  We conjecture that this pattern is the 
result of two mechanisms that work in opposite directions.  Positive attitudes to self-control 
are likely to be associated with following healthy regimes of diet and exercise.  (Causation 
could go in either direction.  An inclination to exercise self-control might be a cause of 
healthy lifestyles.  Alternatively, people with healthy lifestyles might attribute those lifestyles 
to their powers of self-control, and this might induce self-serving approval of self-control.)  
However, people with healthy lifestyles may believe they already exert high levels of self-
control and might approve of this without wishing to exert more self-control than they do.  If 
such people do not identify with Q1–Q8, they may give relatively low-scoring responses.11  
We found no significant interaction between treatment and either of these lifestyle variables.  
[Table 2 near here] 
 Two of the regression equations show a significant gender effect: men express more 
favourable attitudes to self-control than do women. Following up this finding, we 
investigated whether our attention manipulation had different effects for male and female 
participants.  Table 3 breaks down the data in Table 1 by gender.  For male participants, 
spontaneity/self-control scores were significantly higher in the goals treatment than in the 
enjoyment treatment for the 32 questions overall, for the importance in life block and (at the 
10 per cent significance level) for the regrets block.  For female participants, there was no 
significant treatment effect overall; in the importance in life block, the goals treatment 
induced significantly lower scores.  We do not want to make too much of this evidence as the 
survey was not planned with any intention of investigating gender differences.  
[Table 3 near here] 
 As we have explained, one of the objectives of our study was to investigate whether 
judgements about the relative importance of spontaneity and self-control are differentially 
influenced by cues that direct attention to immediate enjoyment or to long-term goals.  We 
found no firm evidence that attention-directing cues have systematic effects on such 
judgements.  Given that this was a study with pre-registered hypothesis tests, it is appropriate 
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to interpret its results in Popperian terms.12  The null hypothesis was that judgements about 
spontaneity and self-control are context-independent.  Our design tested that hypothesis in a 
situation in which there was prior reason to expect it to be falsified, but in fact it was not.  
This result does not establish the null hypothesis as true, but (according to Popperian 
methodology) one can be more confident in a hypothesis, the more successfully it withstands 
attempts to falsify it. 
 As explained in Section 3.1, our memory-recall tasks were not priming manipulations 
expected to work through subconscious channels.  They were intended to activate, and did 
indeed activate, conscious processes of relevant memory retrieval, reasoning and judgement.  
Thus, our results should not be interpreted merely as corroboration of recent scepticism about 
the replicability of priming experiments (e.g., Kahneman, 2012).  Our experimental design 
was based on the premise that, if individuals’ judgements about the relative importance of 
spontaneity and self-control were characterised by a considerable degree of context-
dependence, our memory-recall tasks would exert measurable influences.13  It should be 
remembered that our aim was to investigate the effects of attention-focusing cues on 
individuals’ cool judgements.  Context-independence of such judgements may coexist with 
significant shifts of preference between hot and cold emotional states.  Of course, there are 
severe constraints on the kinds of manipulations that can be used in online or laboratory 
experiments.  As suggested by an anonymous referee, it could be that the phrasing of the 
judgement elicitation questions encouraged participants to think of their attitudes to self-
control and spontaneity as fixed traits.  
6.  The relative importance of spontaneity and self-control 
As explained in Section 5, we designed the judgement elicitation questions in the hope that 
spontaneity/self-control scores for the 32 individual questions could be combined into a 
reliable scale for measuring individuals’ judgements about the importance of exercising self-
control.  Failing that, we hoped to define such scales for the separate categories 
corresponding with our four blocks of questions, or for combinations of those.  In this 
section, we discuss how far we succeeded and what can be learned by organising individuals’ 
responses in this way.  Because we did not find differences between the two treatments, for 
the purposes of this analysis we will pool all the data. 
 The relevant data are summarised in Table 4.  The ‘mean score’ column of this table 
shows the mean and standard deviation of responses to each of the 32 questions.  The next 
column reports the item-rest correlations generated by treating all 32 responses as items in a 
single scale.  It is immediately clear that each of the items in the self-control wishes, 
spontaneity wishes and (with the exception of Q24) regrets blocks is strongly and positively 
correlated with the other items in the overall scale.  In contrast, the importance in life items 
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have generally low (and sometimes negative) item-rest correlations.  This pattern suggests 
that our aim of expressing all elicited judgements on a single scale was too ambitious. 
[Table 4 near here] 
 The ‘Q1–Q24’ column of Table 4 uses the responses from the first 24 questions to 
create a single scale.  Notice that this scale preserves equality between the number of items 
that favour spontaneity and the number that favour self-control.14   The consistently high and 
positive item-rest correlations and the Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.837 give us confidence 
that this is a reliable scale for measuring attitudes that people express in relation to concrete 
activities, events and feelings that recur in everyday life.  We will refer to this as a scale of 
everyday spontaneity/self-control. 
 In contrast, we suggest that Q25–Q32 are picking up more ‘philosophical’ judgements 
about spontaneity or self-control, considered in general.  The final column of Table 4 uses the 
responses to Q25–Q32 to create a spontaneity/self-control scale that is related to such 
judgements.  We will call this the importance in life scale.  The item-rest correlations are all 
positive, but generally lower than those for the everyday scale, and the Cronbach’s alpha 
value of 0.527 is rather low.  Our tentative conclusion is that Q25–Q32 may not be picking 
up a single attitude.  There is no significant correlation between individual scores on the 
‘everyday’ and ‘importance in life’ scales (Spearman’s rho = 0.074, p = 0.255). 
Because our everyday spontaneity/self-control scale combines responses to equal 
numbers of items favouring spontaneity and items favouring self-control, it is a reasonable 
starting point for analysis to interpret the mid-point of the scale as expressing an equal degree 
of approval of spontaneity and self-control.  For example, consider a participant who 
recognises herself equally well in the statements ‘After ordering desserts in restaurants, I 
often feel regret’ (Q18) and ‘After ordering a healthy dish, I often wish I’d chosen something 
tastier’ (Q21).  The first statement expresses regret about having chosen enjoyment when the 
alternative was self-control; the second expresses regret about having exercised self-control 
when the alternative was enjoyment.  It is natural to interpret these statements as equal and 
opposite.  Of course, many of the statements we use cannot be paired in such an obvious way, 
and even Q18 and Q21 are not exact opposites.  This is an unavoidable property of a survey 
instrument that presents respondents with informal and engaging statements about everyday 
life.  We can only say that we did our best to ensure balance between statements in favour of 
spontaneity and statements in favour of self-control. 
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the scores for each of the four blocks and for the 
everyday spontaneity/self-control scale obtained by aggregating across the first three blocks.  
For each participant, we averaged their responses to the questions belonging to the relevant 
block.  The histograms report the frequencies of the corresponding mean scores.  The left-
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hand side of each diagram (score < 4) indicates that, on average, the participant leans towards 
spontaneity; the right-hand side (score > 4) that they lean towards self-control. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 Averaging over Q1–Q24, the mean response was 4.17, not far above the mid-point of 
the scale.  Average responses for self-control wishes (4.29) and spontaneity wishes (4.35) 
were close to one another and slightly above the mid-point; average responses for regrets 
(3.88) were slightly below it.  Some statements consistently elicited responses at the high end 
of the scale – for example, support for ‘I wish I took more exercise’ (Q5, average score 5.16), 
or lack of support for ‘If I choose to walk because it’s healthy, I often regret it along the way’ 
(Q22, average reverse-coded score 5.67).  Other statements consistently elicited responses at 
the opposite end of the scale – for example, lack of support for ‘I wish I drank less sugary 
drinks’ (Q3, average score 3.03) and ‘After ordering desserts in restaurants, I often feel 
regret’ (Q18, average score 2.71).  Overall, the evidence from the ‘everyday’ questions 
suggests that our participants were about as likely to identify with statements favouring 
spontaneity as with statements favouring self-control. 
 What can we learn from the importance in life questions?  The mean response to 
Q25–Q32 was 3.77, slightly below the mid-point of the scale.  Four of these questions are 
particularly interesting because they elicit responses towards the two ends of the scale.  There 
was strong support for ‘It’s important to make long-term plans and stick to them’ (Q27, 
average score 4.90) and ‘In life it’s important to be able to resist temptation’ (Q28, average 
score 4.79).  These are direct statements of the value of self-control as a general principle or 
life strategy.  But there was even stronger support for ‘There’s no harm in occasionally taking 
a break from an exercise routine’ (Q29, average reverse-coded score 2.61) and ‘Having 
occasional treats is an important source of happiness for me, even if they are bad for my 
health’ (Q30, average reverse-coded score 2.13).  It seems that a typical person’s 
philosophical attitude to self-control can be expressed in proverbial (or fortune cookie) form 
as: There’s a time for keeping resolutions, and a time for breaking them. 
 Figure 1 also reveals a considerable degree of heterogeneity in people’s judgements.  
In all four blocks, we see that there are people with strong preference for self-control, as well 
as people with strong preference for spontaneity.  Obviously, because each subscale is 
obtained by averaging (at least) eight responses, intermediate values are more common than 
extreme ones.  This is also why the ‘everyday’ scale (which averages over twenty-four as 
opposed to eight responses) has a less spread out distribution.  It is notable that some scores 
(e.g., spontaneity wishes) show a higher degree of individual-level heterogeneity than others 
(e.g., regrets).  Even for our most reliable ‘everyday’ scale, the degree of heterogeneity is 
substantial.  Although a sizeable majority of respondents lean towards self-control, a 
significant minority displays an overall preference for spontaneity.  This suggests that 
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policies based on a one-size-fits-all approach that assumes a universal desire for self-control 
may not do justice to the preferences of many.   
7.  Conclusion 
Sunstein and Thaler’s New Year’s Resolution Test is an informal expression of an idea that is 
widely used in discussions of behavioural public policy.  This idea is that, in many everyday 
decisions about such matters as diet and exercise, individuals experience self-control failures 
– they face conflicts between desires for immediate enjoyment and commitments to long-
term goals, try to resist the temptation to act on those desires, but fail in the attempt.  By 
investigating individuals’ self-acknowledged goals, it is suggested, behavioural economists 
can identify self-control failures and design policy interventions to counter them – 
interventions that can be justified as enactments of individuals’ own judgements.  
 Our findings are consistent with a more nuanced understanding of the psychology of 
self-control.  Conflicts between desires and goals do indeed appear to be a fundamental 
feature of human life, but it would be a mistake to assume that people’s considered 
judgements always favour their self-acknowledged goals over conflicting desires.  Just as 
people may value the exercise of self-control in achieving their goals, so also they may value 
spontaneity in responding to their desires.  Our findings suggest that spontaneity and self-
control can be interpreted as opposite directions along a single scale.  We have found 
considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ judgements about the relative importance of 
spontaneity and self-control, with a large minority of our respondents leaning more towards 
spontaneity.  We have not found evidence that such judgements, when elicited from 
individuals in cool emotional states, are context-dependent. 
 As we have acknowledged from the outset, our findings are those of an exploratory 
study.  We see them as opening up an agenda of under-researched questions about attitudes to 
spontaneity.  One obvious question concerns the robustness of our finding that those attitudes 
are not subject to significant attention-focusing effects.  To answer that question, it would be 
useful to investigate wider ranges of long-term goals and attention-focusing cues.  It would 
also be useful to investigate the possibility, tentatively suggested in Section 5, of gender 
differences in attitudes to spontaneity and self-control: men’s attitudes may be more 
favourable to self-control, and more susceptible to attention-focusing cues, than women’s.  A 
further possibility is that some kinds of deviation from long-term goals are viewed as more 
spontaneity-affirming than others.  For example, recall the contrast between our respondents’ 
spontaneity-favouring attitudes to sugary drinks and restaurant desserts and their self-control-
favouring attitudes to exercise.  Breaking a health-oriented resolution by ordering a crème 
brûlée is perhaps a more positive way of expressing spontaneity than not taking one’s daily 
run on a wet day. 
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 To our knowledge, the idea that spontaneity might be valued does not appear 
explicitly in Sunstein and Thaler’s writings, or in other work in behavioural economics that 
seeks to remedy self-control problems.  However, as a footnote to a discussion of diet and 
obesity, Sunstein and Thaler (2003: 1167, note 19) discuss the related value of autonomy – 
that ‘people are entitled to make their own choices even if they err’.  Recognising that idea as 
a possible objection to their proposals for nudging, they say: ‘We do not disagree with the 
view that autonomy has claims of its own, but we believe that it would be fanatical, in the 
settings we discuss, to treat autonomy, in the form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump, 
not to be overridden on consequentialist grounds’.  An advocate of libertarian paternalism 
might make a similar argument about spontaneity – that spontaneity has moral claims of its 
own, but that it would be fanatical to claim that, if the pleasures of spontaneity are taken into 
account, most obese people are choosing the best means of promoting their well-being.  If the 
criterion on which public policies are justified is the maximisation of overall well-being, the 
truth or falsity of such claims is clearly important.  But our paper is about the idea that public 
policies can be justified on the grounds that they help individuals to overcome self-
acknowledged self-control problems.  If that idea is to be used as a guiding principle, we need 
to be assured that those individuals want to be helped. 
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Whitney test) (n = 240) (n = 120) (n = 120) 
Q1–Q8 (self-control wishes) 4.29 (1.09)  4.22 (1.06) 4.36 (1.13) 0.208 
Q9–Q16 (spontaneity wishes) 4.35 (1.30) 4.45 (1.20) 4.25 (1.38) 0.312 
Q17–Q24 (regrets) 3.88 (0.81) 3.80 (0.77) 3.95 (0.84) 0.084* 
Q25–Q32 (importance in life) 3.77 (0.71) 3.77 (0.70) 3.76 (0.73) 0.894 
Q1–Q32 4.07 (0.42) 4.06 (0.36) 4.08 (0.47) 0.761 
Note: Mean scores of spontaneity/self-control ratings in the relevant questions for the relevant treatments (standard 





Table 2:  Regression results 
 
 












      
Male 0.166*** 0.147 0.602*** -0.135 0.0504 
 (0.056) (0.134) (0.167) (0.107) (0.089) 
 
     
Age (years) -0.002 -0.009* 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
     
Diet (Likert) 0.052** -0.255*** 0.219*** 0.038 0.207*** 
 (0.024) (0.058) (0.071) (0.046) (0.038) 
 
     
Exercise (Likert) 0.004 -0.137*** 0.037 0.089** 0.030 
 (0.021) (0.051) (0.063) (0.041) (0.034) 
 
     
Goals treatment 0.022 0.131 -0.170 0.130 -0.002 
 (0.054) (0.128) (0.160) (0.103) (0.085) 
 
     
Constant 3.827*** 6.101*** 3.022*** 3.538*** 2.649*** 
 (0.129) (0.313) (0.390) (0.250) (0.208) 
      
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.073 0.198 0.116 0.062 0.174 





Table 3:  Gender breakdown of context-dependence effects 
 
       
       
Questions 
Male   Female 
Enjoyment Goals 
p 
 Enjoyment Goals 
p 
(n = 47) (n = 43)   (n = 73) (n = 77) 
Q1 – Q8 4.26 (1.15) 4.48 (1.12) 0.233  4.20 (1.00) 4.29 (1.13) 0.519 
Q9 – Q16 4.80 (1.18) 4.65 (1.04) 0.489  4.22 (1.17) 4.03 (1.50) 0.322 
Q17 – Q24 3.69 (0.69) 3.95 (0.72) 0.072*  3.87 (0.81) 3.95 (0.90) 0.392 
Q25 – Q32 3.61 (0.74) 4.00 (0.79) 0.015**  3.87 (0.65) 3.63 (0.67) 0.023** 
All 4.09 (0.37) 4.27 (0.42) 0.037**   4.04 (0.36) 3.98 (0.47) 0.301 











All Q1–Q24 Q25–Q32 
Q1  wish ate more fruit and vegetables 4.72 (1.92) 0.491 0.469  
Q2 wish drank more plain water 4.37 (2.12) 0.353 0.370  
Q3 wish drank less sugary drinks 3.03 (2.05) 0.322 0.337  
Q4 wish ate less high-fat food 4.68 (1.82) 0.555 0.538  
Q5 wish took more exercise 5.16 (1.69) 0.550 0.527  
Q6 wish use lift less often 2.66 (1.70) 0.346 0.335  
Q7 wish less screen time 5.03 (1.73) 0.227 0.220  
Q8 wish less sitting around 4.68 (1.68) 0.409 0.397   
Q9* wish less attention to calorie labels 5.23 (1.84) 0.360 0.395  
Q10* wish more relaxed about eating and drinking 4.51 (1.81) 0.465 0.509  
Q11* envy people who eat what they like 3.98 (2.13) 0.541 0.545  
Q12* wish less pressure to exercise 4.74 (1.86) 0.398 0.390  
Q13* wish felt less bad about lazing around 3.74 (1.82) 0.492 0.487  
Q14* envy people who don’t feel guilty about taking it easy 4.43 (1.94) 0.571 0.584  
Q15* wish cared less about being in good shape 4.41 (1.80) 0.475 0.484  
Q16* envy people who don’t worry about weight 3.76 (2.22) 0.499 0.507   
Q17 regret after drinking alcohol 3.94 (2.13) 0.198 0.215  
Q18 regret after ordering dessert 2.71 (1.78) 0.446 0.480  
Q19 regret after phone/TV 3.91 (1.92) 0.224 0.236  
Q20 regret after taking lift 3.39 (1.96) 0.255 0.252  
Q21* regret not choosing tastier dish 4.21 (1.76) 0.310 0.306  
Q22* regret after choosing to walk 5.67 (1.54) 0.397 0.396  
Q23* no regret after nice meal 3.55 (1.96) 0.246 0.255  
Q24* no regret about skipping exercise 3.63 (1.76) 0.033 0.009   
Q25 important to stick to exercise routine  3.96 (1.64) 0.195  0.289 
Q26 important to eat healthily 3.91 (1.55) 0.060  0.425 
Q27 important to act on long-term plans 4.90 (1.44) 0.029  0.293 
Q28 important to resist temptation 4.79 (1.43) 0.060  0.226 
Q29* no harm in breaking exercise routine 2.61 (1.40) –0.009  0.101 
Q30* important to have occasional treats 2.13 (1.17) 0.040  0.181 
Q31* important to be flexible 3.85 (1.53) –0.018  0.224 
Q32* tomorrow will look after itself 4.00 (1.64) 0.189   0.231 
    
 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.814 0.837 0.527 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Questions favouring spontaneity (marked with asterisks) are reverse coded.
 
 








1 We will use the term goal to refer to preferences that apply to extended sequences of 
decisions, or to the outcomes of such sequences – for example, a preference for taking regular 
exercise or for not being overweight or obese. 
2 The idea that paternalism should be defined in terms of the intentions of the policy-maker is 
defended by Le Grand and New (2015). 
3 This way of modelling human agency as an interaction between the preferences and 
judgements of an ‘inner rational agent’ and ‘errors’ and ‘biases’ that are induced by 
psychological mechanisms is examined and critiqued by Infante et al. (2016). 
4 Della Vigna and Malmendier reject the explanation, sometimes suggested by behavioural 
economists (e.g., Ho, Lim and Camerer, 2006) that ‘paying not to go to the gym’ is a by-
product of a sophisticated self-control strategy.  Their primary explanation is that, when 
buying gym memberships, people fail to anticipate future failures of self-control.   
5 Hofmann et al. do not report the breakdown of actively resisted desires according to 
whether they were or were not problematic.  In Delaney and Lades’s study, 23 per cent of 
non-problematic desires were resisted.  If one assumed the same rate of non-problematic 
resistance in Hofmann et al.’s data, the proportion of problematic desires that were resisted 
would be 71 per cent. 
6 The pilot study was preregistered at AsPredicted.org as ‘Normative economics: context-
dependence of well-being judgements – pilot’ (aspredicted.org, #45444).  It was appended to, 
and formed the final part of, an online experiment which investigated an entirely different 
topic. 
7 See AsPredicted.org (#47116): ‘Normative economics: context-dependence of well-being 
judgements’. 
8 Weingarten et al. (2016) provide a meta-analysis of 133 such studies. 
9 Similar results are found in Tobit models which take account of the censored nature of 
responses. 
10 Because of a software problem that was specific to the demographic questions in the 
questionnaire, our econometric analysis uses age and gender data supplied later by Prolific.  
The survey data were collected on 7 and 8 September 2020, but participants’ ages are coded 
as at 23 March 2021.  Our conclusions are unaffected. 
11 In principle, a mirror-image mechanism is also possible: people with unhealthy lifestyles 
might approve of their own spontaneity without wishing to be more spontaneous, and thus 
give relatively high-scoring responses to Q9–Q16.  However, we find no evidence of this 
effect. 
12 We do not want to claim that experiments should always be set up as tests of pre-registered 
hypotheses. 
13 This methodological strategy, of looking for replicable ‘exhibits’ or ‘bottled phenomena’, 
is explained and defended by Bardsley et al. (2010: 156–169). 
14 For this reason, we include Q24 as an item in the scale.  However, responses to Q24 have 
stronger correlations with the importance in life items than with the Q1–Q23 items. 
